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PROTECTING CITIZENS FROM COPS AND
CROOKS: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE
SUPREME COURT'S INTERPRETATION
OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
DURING THE 1982 TERM
ARNOLD H. LOEWYt
Professor Loewy argues that the primary purpose of the fourth
amendment is to protect innocent citizens, from both criminal activity
and excessive governmental intrusion. In this Article, he reviews the
Supreme Court's 1982 Term, assessing the Court'sperformance in light
of the purposes of the fourth amendment.
The fourth amendment explicitly forbids unreasonable searches and
seizures, and implicitly permits reasonable ones.' The criteria for ascertaining
reasonableness are designed to separate searches and seizures likely to yield
evidence of crime (reasonable searches and seizures) from those unlikely to
yield such evidence (unreasonable searches and seizures).
A search or seizure in which there was an unjustifiably high risk that an
innocent person could have been victimized is declared invalid. Sometimes a
search or seizure is invalid because it occurred when there was an insufficient
probability of finding the sought-after evidence (in legal jargon, no probable
cause).2 Other searches and seizures that were not authorized by a neutral and
detached magistrate3 are invalid because they rendered a presumptively inno-
cent person4 subject to a search or seizure on the whim of a policeman who
may be biased in favor of allowing the search or seizure as opposed to protect-
ing the privacy of the citizen.5 Inasmuch as these criteria are designed to en-
t Professor, University of North Carolina School of Law. B.S. 1961, Boston University;
L.L.B. 1963, L.L.M. 1964, Harvard. The author wishes to thank second-year law students Michael
Kessler and Ellen Gelbin for their research assistance and the University of North Carolina Law
Center for its financial assistance in the preparation of this Article.
1. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no Warrants shall
issue but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
2. See, e.g., Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419'(1969).
3. E.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
4. At trial a defendant is presumed innocent, not because he is probably innocent, but be-
cause fundamental fairness requires that he be clothed with the presumption of innocence until
proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). At the search
and seizure stage, common sense tells us that a significantly higher percentage of these presump-
tively innocent people will be innocent.
5. The point of the fourth amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not
that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences that reasonable men draw from
evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and
detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enter-
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sure that only searches and seizures likely to produce incriminating evidence
are allowed, it seems fair to conclude that the fourth amendment is designed to
protect the innocent.
6
The overall scheme of the amendment (forbidding unreasonable searches
and seizures and implicitly permitting reasonable ones) is designed to protect
innocent citizens from both overzealous police officers (hereinafter called
"cops") and criminals who would otherwise prey on these citizens (hereinafter
called "crooks"). These goals are somewhat contradictory. Protection from
crooks could be maximized by allowing searches and seizures on minimal sus-
picion, hunch, or whim. The fourth amendment, of course, would not tolerate
so much police intrusiveness. 7 Conversely, searches and seizures could be lim-
ited to situations in which the discovery of evidence was virtually certain8 or
they could be eliminated entirely,9 which would require the government to
rely on eyewitness testimony or real evidence obtained without a search or
seizure. Although such procedures would maximize citizens' protection from
cops, it would leave them too vulnerable to crooks. Consequently, the Court's
role under the fourth amendment should be to balance carefully innocent citi-
zens' need for protection from crime against the right to be free from intrusive
searches.
During its 1982 Term, the Supreme Court decided nine cases involving
claims by crooks that their drugs had been unlawfully obtained by the cops. 10
Each one of these fourth amendment claims had been sustained by a federal
circuit court of appeals or by the highest state court that heard the case.II
prise of ferreting out crime. Any assumption that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate's
disinterested determination to issue a search warrant will justify the officers in making a search
without a warrant would reduce the amendment to a nullity and leave people's homes secure only
in the discretion of police officers. Crime, even in the privacy of one's own quarters, is, of course,
of grave concern to society, and the law allows such crime to be reached on proper showing. The
right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is also a grave concern, not only to the individual
but to a society that chooses to dwell in reasonable security and freedom from surveillance. When
the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a
judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent. Johnson v. United States,
333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948) (citations omitted).
6. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Devicefor Protecting the Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REv.
1229, 1229 (1983). ("By 'innocent' I do not mean totally innocent. (How many of us are?) I mean
innocent of the crime charged or not in possession of the evidence sought."),
7. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
8. See, e.g., Illinois v. Andreas, 103 S. Ct. 3319 (1983), discussed infra text accompanying
notes 140-148.
9. It has been contended that the government should not be permitted to search for evidence
of crime, no matter how probable the cause, unless it can assert a superior proprietary interest in
the property to be seized. See White, Forgotten Points in the "Exclusionary Rule" Debate, 81
MICH. L. REv. 1273 (1983); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 312 (1967) (Douglas, J. dissenting).
Both the Court in Warden and this commentator, Loewy, supra note 6, at 1231-44, reject this
contention.
10. United States v. Knotts, 103 S. Ct. 1081 (1983); Florida v. Royer, 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983);
Texas v. Brown, 103 S. Ct. 1535 (1983); Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983); United States v.
Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. 2573 (1983); Illinois v. Lafayette, 103 S. Ct. 2605 (1983); United
States v. Place, 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983); Illinois v. Andreas, 103 S. Ct. 3319 (1983); Michigan v.
Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983). I am excluding from discussion such per curiam and civil cases as




Each was brought to the Supreme Court by the prosecutorial arm of the gov-
ernment disappointed with the loss of its evidence.' 2 In seven of the nine
cases, the Supreme Court reversed the decision below, holding that no fourth
amendment rights were violated.' 3 In the other two cases, the Court upheld
the exclusion of the evidence, but provided the police with significantly more
latitude than was provided by the opinion under review.14
From this breakdown, it would appear that as between cops and crooks,
the Supreme Court gave cops the upper hand. What about innocent citizens?
Certainly, they now have more protection from crooks and less protection
from cops than they had prior to the 1982 Term. This Article's analysis is
directed towards the effect of the 1982 Term's decisions on the citizen's right to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, and to be reasonably pro-
tected from both crooks and cops.
I. THE BEST AND WORST OF THE TERM
The most significant victory for innocent citizens was United States v.
Place,'5 which held: (1) subjecting luggage in a public place to a drug sniffing
dog is not a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment; (2) lengthy
detention of luggage, even for that purpose cannot be predicated upon mere
reasonable suspicion; but (3) a brief seizure of the luggage can be justified by
reasonable suspicion.
In upholding the canine sniff, the Court said:
The Fourth Amendment "protects people from unreasonable gov-
ernment intrusions into their legitimate expectations of privacy." We
have affirmed that a person possesses a privacy interest in the con-
tents of personal luggage that is protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment. A "canine sniff" by a well-trained narcotics detection dog,
however, does not require opening the luggage. It does not expose
noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden from pub-
lic view, as does, for example, an officer's rummaging through the
contents of the luggage. Thus, the manner in which information is
obtained through this investigative technique is much less intrusive
than a typical search. Moreover, the sniff discloses only the presence
or absence of narcotics, a contraband item. Thus, despite the fact that
the sniff tells the authorities something about the contents of the lug-
gage, the information obtained is limited. This limited disclosure
12. Three cases were brought by the United States (United States v. Knotts, 103 S. Ct. 1081
(1983); United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. 2573 (1983); United States v. Place, 103 S.
Ct. 2673 (1983)), three by Illinois (Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983); Illinois v. Lafayette,
103 S. Ct. 2605 (1983); Illinois v. Andreas, 103 S. Ct. 3319 (1983)), and one each by Florida
(Florida v. Royer, 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983)), Texas (Texas v. Brown, 103 S. Ct. 1535 (1983)), and
Michigan (Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983)).
13. United States v. Knotts, 103 S. Ct. 1081 (1983); Texas v. Brown, 103 S. Ct. 1535 (1983);
Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983); United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. 2573
(1983); Illinois v. Lafayette, 103 S. Ct. 2605 (1983); Illinois v. Andreas, 103 S. Ct. 3319 (1983);
Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983).
14. Florida v. Royer, 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983); United States v. Place, 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983).
15. 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983).
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also ensures that the owner of the property is not subjected to the
embarrassment and inconvenience entailed in less discriminate and
more intrusive investigative methods.
In these respects, the canine sniff is sul generis. We are aware of
no other investigative procedure that is so limited both in the manner
in which the information is obtained and in the content of the infor-
mation revealed by the procedure. Therefore, we conclude that the
particular course of investigation that the agents intended to pursue
here--exposure of respondent's luggage, which was located in a pub-
lic place, to a trained canine-did not constitute a "search" within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.' 6
Stated differently, the dog can detect a crook's drugs without revealing
anything that an innocent citizen may wish to keep private.' 7 A better device
for protecting citizens from both cops and crooks is hard to imagine.' 8 Be-
yond this, the knowledge that a dog's sniffing a suitcase in a public place is not
a search should encourage policemen to station more dogs at airports. This
will benefit innocent citizens because drug smugglers will be deterred if they
are aware of the dogs, or caught if they are not aware of them.
Less obvious, but at least as important to the innocent citizen, the availa-
bility of dogs should reduce unpleasant or frightening confrontations between
cops and citizens. Before the use of drug-detecting dogs was legalized, a cop
who suspected a citizen of drug smuggling would question the citizen and seek
permission to search his suitcases. The frightened citizen would likely (and
probably correctly) perceive that he would be detained beyond the departure
of his airplane flight if he did not consent to the search. Consequently most
innocent citizens consented.' 9 Even those that did not consent could not be
certain that the cops would respect their privacy.20 With the legality of dog
sniffs now ensconced in our jurisprudence, one might hope that a cop who
becomes suspicious of an individual would not subject him to questioning, but
would subject his baggage to a dog sniff after he has voluntarily relinquished
16. Id. at 2644-45 (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7
(1977)).
17. Be it his shaving lotion, secret woman's undergarments which he wears in private, litera-
ture which is kinky or subversive (in the opinion of the police) or, perish the thought, a Duke
University pennant.
18. At least in society as it actually exists. I have suggested elsewhere that "[i]n a Utopian
society, each policeman would be equipped with an evidence-detecting divining rod. He would
walk up and down the streets and whenever the divining rod detected evidence of crime, it would
locate the evidence. First it would single out the house, then it would point to the room, then the
drawer, and finally the evidence itself. Thus, all evidence of crime would be uncovered in the
most efficient possible manner, and no innocent person would be subject to a search." Loewy,
supra note 6, at 1244.
19. In United States v. Van Lewis, 409 F. Supp. 535 (E.D. Mich. 1976), a'd, 556 F.2d 385
(6th Cir. 1977), the court reviewed the consent statistics for the D.E.A. drug courier enforcement
program. "Of the 77 searches in which illegal drugs were found, the agents identified 26 consent
searches. Forty-three searches were nonconsensual. Illegal contraband was seized in all cases in
whch consent was not given and a search was made. In 15 to 25 consent searches, agents did not
uncover any contraband drugs." Van Lewis, 409 F. Supp. at 539.
20. See id. at 540 (discussing defendant Hughes).
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possession of it by checking it with the airline.21 If the police do so change
their tactics, the Court's turning loose the dogs could be an important though
not immediately apparent victory for civil liberties.
22
A more obvious victory for innocent citizens' civil liberties was the
Court's unanimous invalidation of the ninety-minute seizure of Place's lug-
gage.23 Demonstrating an unusual concern for the right of innocent travelers,
the Court emphatically rejected the Government's attempt to justify a lengthy
detention of luggage:
The premise of the Government's argument is that seizures of prop-
erty are generally less intrusive than seizures of the person. While
true in some circumstances, that premise is faulty on the facts we
address in this case. The precise type of detention we confront here is
seizure of personal luggage from the immediate possession of the sus-
pect for the purpose of arranging exposure to a narcotics detection
dog. Particularly in the case of detention of luggage within the trav-
eler's immediate possession, the police conduct intrudes on both the
suspect's possessory interest in his luggage as well as his liberty inter-
est in proceeding with his itenerary. The person whose luggage is
detained is technically still free to continue his travels or carry out
other personal activities pending release of the luggage. . . . Never-
theless, such a seizure can effectively restrain the person since he is
subjected to the possible disruption of his travel plans in order to
remain with his luggage or to arrange for its return ....
The length of the detention of respondent's luggage alone pre-
cludes the conclusion that the seizure was reasonable in the absence
of probable cause. Although we have recognized the reasonableness
of seizures longer than [momentary ones]. . . the brevity of the inva-
sion of the individual's Fourth Amendment interests is an important
factor in determining whether the seizure is so minimally intrusive as
to be justifiable on reasonable suspicion. Moreover, in assessing the
effect of the length of the detention, we take into account whether the
police diligently pursue their investigation. We note that here the
New York agents knew the time of Place's scheduled arrival at La-
Guardia, had ample time to arrange for their additional investigation
at that location, and thereby could have minimized the intrusion on
respondent's Fourth Amendment interests ....
Although the 90-minute detention of respondent's luggage is
sufficient to render the seizure unreasonable, the violation was exac-
erbated by the failure of the agents to accurately inform respondent
of the place to which they were transporting his luggage, of the
21. See, e.g., the preseizure procedure in United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977). In-
deed, the police could secretly subject all such luggage to a dog sniff.
22. It was not immediately obvious to Justice Brennan. See Place, 103 S. Ct. at 2651 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring).
23. Justice O'Connor wrote the opinion of the Court, which Justices Rehnquist, Powell, Ste-
vens, White and Chief Justice Burger joined, Place, 103 S. Ct. 2637; Justices Brennan and Black-
mun wrote separate opinions in which they concurred in the result, id. at 2646 (Brennan, J.,
concurring); id. at 2651 (Blackmnun, J., concurring). Justice Marshall joined both of the latter
opinions.
19841
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEWV
length of time he might be dispossessed, and of what arrangements
would be made for return of the luggage if the investigation dispelled
the suspicion. In short, we hold that the detention of respondent's
luggage in this case went beyond the narrow authority possessed by
police to detain briefly luggage reasonably suspected to contain
narcotics.
24
Although the Court did permit a temporary seizure of luggage on reason-
able suspicion, even this portion of the opinion reflected a need to protect
citizens from cops as well as crooks. In Place the Court defined reasonable
suspicion as "specific articulable facts that. . . lead [the officer] reasonably to
believe that a traveler is carrying luggage that contains narcotics. ' 25 Defini-
tionally, at least, this standard is not far short of probable cause.26 Yet the
Court clearly required that the police intrusion be minimal in order to be sus-
tained. A willing Court could have found probable cause,27 thereby allowing
more intrusion. Happily this Court did not.
While Place represents the zenith of the Supreme Court's effort last Term
to carefully balance the citizen's need to be protected from both cops and
crooks, United States v. Villamonte-Marquez28 is surely the nadir. In Vii-
lamonte-Marquez the Court, purportedly relying on "the overarching principle
of 'reasonableness,' "29 upheld a statute providing that "any officer of the cus-
toms may at any time go on board of any vessel. . . at any place in the United
States. . .and examine the manifest and other documents and papers.. . and
to this end may hail and stop such vessel. . . and use all necessary force to
compel compliance. o30 Although one could argue that the customs officer and
the state patrolman who boarded the respondents' boat had a good reason for
doing so, 31 the opinion proceeded on the assumption that they did not.3 2 Sim-
ilarly, although the boarding occurred in midday, nothing in the opinion sug-
gested a different result had the officers accepted the statutory invitation to
board at a less convenient time, for example, three o'clock in the morning.33
Indeed, to the extent that a customs officer might wish to use a purported
document inspection as an excuse to look for illegal aliens or drugs,34 one
24. Place, 103 S. Ct. at 2645-46.
25. Id. at 2644.
26. If it is short at all. See infra text accompanying notes 43-105.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 43-105.
28. 103 S. Ct. 2573 (1983).
29. Id. at 2579.
30. Id. at 2575 (emphasis added) (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1976)).
31. Just prior to the boarding, a freighter had passed defendants' anchored forty-foot sailboat
causing the sailboat to rock violently from side to side. In response to the officer's questions about
whether the sailboat and crew were all right, one of the defendants shrugged his shoulders
nonresponsively. Villamonle-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2576-77.
32. Id. at 2575-82 (At least no reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing. No other reason, beyond
a general desire to check registration, was presented.).
33. The only suggested limitation was to waters providing ready access to the sea. Query if
even that limitation will be followed. Cf. Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2589-90 n.10 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting).
34. Perhaps the true rationale for the boarding in this case. See Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S.
Ct at 2577 n.3.
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might expect some midnight or early morning raids since at that hour it would
more likely be necessary to go below deck in order to find the occupants (who,
of course, would be sleeping) and in the process view more places where drugs
or aliens could be hidden. Thus, to ensure that improperly registered boats are
not docked in our harbors,35 every person who ever sleeps in a boat so docked
is subject to an invasion of privacy at the whim of any customs officer.
Although this is precisely the type of invasion that precipitated the fourth
amendment, 36 the Court upheld the statute largely because a similar statute
was passed by the first Congress, many of whose members helped frame the
Constitution, thereby giving it "an impressive historical pedigree.' 37 Yet it
was those same constitution-framers and congressmen who gave us such gems
as the Alien and Sedition Acts38 and empowered the Supreme Court to issue
writs of mandamus as a matter of original jurisdiction.39 Furthermore, while
the original statute did permit customs officers to examine the manifest and
board a boat, it did not permit them to do so at any time.4°
There is no issue in this case concerning the activites of the officers once they
boarded the Henry Morgan II. The only questions presented to this Court concerns the
validity of the suspicionless boarding of the vessel for a document inspection.
Respondents, however, contend in the alternative that because the Customs officers
were accompanied by a Louisiana State Policeman, and were following an informant's
tip that a vessel in the ship channel was thought to be carrying marijuana, they may not
rely on the statute authorizing boarding for inspection of the vessel's documentation.
This line of reasoning was rejected in a similar situation in Scott v. United States, 436
U.S. 128, 135-139 (1978), and we again reject it. Acceptance of respondent's argument
would lead to the incongruous result criticized by Judge Campbell in his opinion in
United States v. Arra, 630 F.2d 836, 846 (Ist Cir. 1980): "We would see little logic in
sanctioning such examinations of ordinary, unsuspect vessels but forbidding them in the
case of suspected smugglers."
Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2577 n.3 (citations omitted).
35. The boat in Villamonle-Marquez was docked. Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S.Ct. at 2576.
36. See, eg., John Adams' "abstract" of the argument of James Otis in Paxton's Case,
Quincy Mass. Bay Rep. 51 (1761). "'Custom-house officers may enter our houses when they
please-we are commanded to permit their entry-their menial servants may enter-may break
through malice or revenge, no man, no court can inquire-bare suspicion without oath is suffi-
cient."' M. SMITH, THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE CASE 344 (1978) (quoting Adams in the Massa-
chusetts Spy, April 29, 1773).
Otis' argument in Paxton's Case "was perhaps the most prominent event which inaugurated
the resistance of the colonies to the oppression of the mother country." M. SMITH supra, at 36 n.9
(quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S 616, 625 (1886)); See also N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND
DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, 56-61
(1937).
37. Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2578.
38. Alien and Sedition Act, ch. 74, 1 stat. 596 (1798) (expired). "I had conceived that the
United States through many years had shown its repentance for the Sedition Act of 1798 by repay-
ing fines that it imposed." Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
39. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (holding such power
unconstitutional).
40. In 1790 the first Congress enacted a comprehensive statute "to provide more effectually
for the collection of the duties imposed by law on goods, wares and merchandise imported into the
United States, and on the tonnage of ships or vessels." Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, 1 Stat. 145,
repealed by Act of March 2, 1799, ch. 22, 1 Stat. 627. Section 31 of that Act provided in pertinent
part as follows:
That it shall be lawful for all collectors, naval officers, inspectors, and the officers of the
revenue cutters herein after mentioned, to go on board of ships or vessels in any part of
the United States, or within four leagues of the coast thereof, if bound to the United
1984]
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On the brighter side, it is possible that the Court, which twice referred to
the modest or limited intrusion in this case,4 1 would not sustain a midnight
check such as the statute authorizes. If so, perhaps the opinion could be up-
graded from an unmitigated disaster to just another very bad decision. 42 Until
the Court says otherwise, however, one's right to sleep on one's boat depends
on the unfettered whim of a customs officer as he goes about trying to stamp
out crime.
II. THE MEANING OF PROBABLE CAUSE
Probable cause is the substantive heart of the fourth amendment.43 With-
out probable cause, no warrant may issue44 and absent some unusual circum-
stance,45 no search or seizure may occur. The purpose of probable cause is to
allow citizens a modicum of protection from overzealous cops while at the
same time allowing the cops enough leeway to protect citizens from crooks.
4 6
One's general definition or particular assessment of probable cause obviously
will be affected by the considerations that concern him most.
4 7
In its definition and application of probable cause, nobody could accuse
the Court in Illinois v. Gates4 8 of being unsympathetic to the cops' need for
States, whether in or out of their respective districts, for the purposes of demanding the
manifests aforesaid, and of examining and searching the said ships or vessels ....
Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2577 (quoting Act of August 4, 1790, ch. 35, § 31, 1 Stat. 145,
164).
41. "Neither the [vessel] nor its occupants are searched, and visual inspection of the [vessel] is
limited to what can be seen without a search." Villamonfe-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2581 (quoting
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558 (1976)). Any interference with interests pro-
tected by the fourth amendment is, of course, intrusive to some degree. But in this case, the inter-
ference created only a modest intrusion. Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2581-82.
The nature of the governmental interest in assuring compliance with documentation require-
ments, particularly in waters where the need to deter or apprehend smugglers is great, are substan-
tial; the type of intrusion made in this case, while not minimal, is limited. Id. at 2582.
42. Since, in any event, it allows the suspicionless search on the whim of a customs officer, it
cannot be upgraded further.
43. The warrant issuing process is the procedural heart.
44. "[No] Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S.
CONsT. amend. IV.
45. E.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (inventory search), Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968) (stop and frisk).
46. These long-prevailing standards (for determining probable cause) seek to safeguard
citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy and from unfounded
charges of crime. They also seek to give fair leeway for enforcing the law in the commu-
nity's protection. Because many situations which confront officers in the course of exe-
cuting their duties are more or less ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes
on their part. But the mistakes must be those of reasonable men, acting on facts leading
sensibly to their conclusions of probability. The rule of probable cause is a practical,
nontechnical conception affording the best compromise that has been found for accom-
modating these often opposing interests. Requiring more would unduly hamper law en-
forcment. To allow less would be to leave law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the
officers' whim or caprice.
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949).
47. Compare the majority opinion, 1d. at 175-76, with the dissenting opinion, 1d. at 180 (Jack-
son, J., dissenting), in Brinegar.
48. 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
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leeway in catching crooks. Whether the Court was sufficiently sympathetic to
innocent citizens' need to be protected from overzealous cops is considerably
more doubtful.
The situation in Gates began on May 3, 1978, when the Bloomingdale,
Illinois police department received an anonymous handwritten letter:
This letter is to inform you that you have a couple in your town
who strictly make their living on selling drugs. They are Sue and
Lance Gates, they live on Greenway, off Bloomingdale Rd. in the
condominiums. Most of their buys are done in Florida. Sue his wife
drives their car to Florida, where she leaves it to be loaded up with
drugs, then Lance flys [sic] down and drives it back. She flys [sic]
back after she drops the car off in Florida. May 3 she is driving
down there again and Lance will by flying down in a few days to
drive it back. At the time Lance drives the car back he has the trunk
loaded with over $100,000.00 in drugs. Presently they have over
$100,000.00 worth of drugs in their basement.
They brag about the fact they never have to work, and make
their entire living on pushers.
I guarantee if you watch them carefully you will make a big
catch. They are friends with some big drugs [sic] dealers, who visit
their house often.49
Upon receiving this letter, Detective Mader of the Bloomingdale Police
Force ascertained the following facts: First, he obtained from the Secretary of
State's Office an address and physical description of a Lance B. Gates, to
whom a driver's license had been issued. The address was different from that
which appeared in the anonymous letter. Second, he learned from a confiden-
tial informant who had previously given reliable information that a check of
financial records revealed that Gates had moved to the Greenway address
listed in the anonymous letter. Third, a Chicago police officer advised him
that one L. Gates was registered on a 4:15 p.m. flight to Atlanta and West
Palm Beach on May 5, 1978, and could be reached at 980-8427. Last, the
phone company informed him that 980-8427 was a nonpublished phone
number issued to Lance Gates at 189B Greenway Drive, Bloomingdale, Ill.50
On May 5 a drug enforcement officer observed a person using the name
Lance Gates and matching Gates' description board the 4:15 plane to Atlanta
and West Palm Beach. The next day, Mader was informed that federal agents
in Florida had observed:
1) Gates arrive in West Palm Beach, Florida via Eastern Flight
Number 245 and remain in the airport for one hour before taking a
taxi to the West Palm Beach Holiday Inn; 2) the room he entered was
registered to one Susan Gates; 3) at 7:00 AM May 6, 1978, Lance
Gates and a female left the Holiday Inn room registered to Susan
Gates, and entered a red vinyl over gray Mercury bearing Illinois
49. Id. at 2325.
50. People v. Gates, 82 Ill. App. 3d 749, 751, 403 N.E.2d 77, 78-79 (1980), rev'd sub nom
Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
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1978 license RS 8437; 4) Lance Gates and the female left the West
Palm Beach area driving the Mercury northbound on that interstate
highway commonly used by travelers to the Chicago area.-"
Mader also learned that a "check of the records of the Illinois Secretary of
State revealed that license RS 8437 registers to LANCE B. GATES on a 1975
Hornet station wagon,. . . [and] that the driving time from West Palm Beach,
Florida to Bloomingdale, Illinois is approximately 21-23 hours." 52 Armed
with this information, Mader obtained a search warrant for the Gateses' car
and home. At 5:15 the next morning, the Gateses returned home where they
were met by the Bloomingdale police who executed the warrant, finding con-
traband in both the car and home.
53
Prior to Gates a warrant could not validly be issued on the word of an
informant unless the magistrate was given some basis for judging both the
credibility of the informant and the reliability of his information.54 Gates held
"that these elements should [not] be understood as entirely separate and in-
dependent requirements to be rigidly exacted in every case. . . . Rather...
they should be understood simply as closely intertwined issues that may use-
fully illuminate the commonsense, practical question whether there is 'prob-
able cause' to believe that contraband or evidence is located in a particular
place."'55 Thus, what had come to be known as the Aguilar-Spinelli two-
pronged (credibility and reliability) test56 was overruled.
In a vitriolic dissent, not atypical of him, Justice Brennan said, "words
such as 'practical,' 'nontechnical' and 'commonsense' as used in the Court's
opinion, are but code words for an overly permissive attitude towards police
practices in derogation of the rights secured by the fourth amendment. ' 57 In
response, the Court, per Justice Rehnquist, countered:
"Fidelity" to the commands of the Constitution suggests balanced
judgment rather than exhortation. The highest "fidelity" is achieved
neither by the judge who instinctively goes furthest in upholding
even the most bizarre claim of individual constitutional rights, any
more than it is achieved by a judge who instinctively goes furthest in
accepting the most restrictive claims of governmental authorities.
The task of this Court, as of other courts, is to "hold the balance
true," and we think we have done that in this case.
58
"Holding the balance true," of course, requires an accurate assessment of
the interests to be balanced. The Court unquestionably appreciated the cops'
need to be free of excessive inhibitions in the crook-catching process. In justi-
fying the demise of Spinelli, the Court said: "[T]he direction taken by decisions
51. d at 79, 403 N.E.2d at 751.
52. Id at 757, 403 N.E.2d at 82-83.
53. Id at 752, 403 N.E.2d at 79-80.
54. See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
55. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2327-28.
56. See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
57. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2359 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
58. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2333-34.
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following Spinelli poorly serves 'the most basic function of any government: to
provide for the security of the individual and his property.' The strictures that
inevitably accompany the 'two-pronged test' cannot avoid seriously impeding
the task of law enforcement."59 Yet the very purpose of the fourth amend-
ment strictures are to impede law enforcement (at least to some degree) in
order "to provide for the security of the individual and his property," which
can be threatened by cops as well as crooks. The Court's inability or unwill-
ingness to perceive the true balance is illustrated by its attempt to justify the
standard as one which "will better achieve the accommodation of public and
private interests that the Fourth Amendment requires." 60 This subtle mis-
statement suggests that a citizen's interest in receiving protection from crooks
is public, whereas his or her interest in protection from cops is merely private.
In fact, each of these interests have public and private components. Both soci-
ety at large and the immediately affected individual are victimized when one's
property or security is unjustifiably invaded by either a cop or a crook.
From the innocent person's perspective, overruling Aguilar-Spinelli was
not all bad. State court misapplication of the rule had resulted in overturning
several convictions of crooks that should have been upheld. 61 Although occa-
sional misapplication of a rule would not normally justify jettisoning it, the
ease of misapplication certainly cuts against the argument that the rule creates
a bright line test for police and magistrates. 62 Furthermore, depending on the
judge, the rule may not make much difference. For example of the four opin-
ions in Gates, two analyzed the situation under totality of the circumstances
and two under Aguilar-Spinelli In each group of two, one found the search
valid, and one found it invalid.63 Thus, the important question is the quality
of the new test rather then the demise of the old.
Under the Court's new standard for ascertaining probable cause, magis-
trates are left unguided about the type and quantum of evidence necessary to
constitute probable cause.
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, com-
mon-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in
the affidavit before him, including the "veracity" and "basis of
knowledge" of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a
particular place.64
The amorphous character of the term "fair probability" is exacerbated by
the Court's definition of what it does not mean: "Finely-tuned standards such
59. Id at 2331 (citations omitted).
60. Id. at 2332 (emphasis added).
61. See id. at 2330, n.9.
62. In recent years, the Court has stressed the importance of "bright line" rules to guide the
police. See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981).
63. Justices Rehnquist and Stevens analyzed the search under a totality of circumstances test.
Justice Rehnquist found the search valid, Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2320, while Justice Stevens found it
invalid, id. at 2360. Justices White and Brennan analyzed the search under the Spinel/i-A guilar
test. Justice White found it valid, id. at 2336, while Justice Brennan found it invalid, id. at 2351.
64. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2332.
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as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence,
useful in formal trials, have no place in the magistrate's decision."' 65 It seems
clear that the Court did not just reject the words "preponderance of the evi-
dence" but rejected the concept of "more likely than not" because it thought
that no "numerically precise degree of certainty corresponding to 'probable
cause' [would be] helpful." 66 Consequently, magistrates are left unguided not
only concerning the type of evidence necessary to constitute probable cause,
but also concerning how probable the cause must be in order to qualify. Of
greater concern is the likelihood that this probable cause definition will spill
over into situations in which the police act without a warrant,67 which will
leave those "engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime"68 with the right to search those who they believe to be probably inno-
cent so long as this greater probability of innocence is countered by a "fair
probability" of finding evidence of crime.
69
In rejecting the preponderance of evidence standard, the Court appears to
be fighting the usual definition of "probable." While it might be technically
correct to call something with any degree of probability "probable" (e.g., if
there is a 1% probability that Lance Gates has marijuana, it is probable that he
has it), such a definition would denude the fourth amendment of any meaning
and the Court rightly rejected it. The only other commonly accepted defini-
tion of "probable" is "more likely than not."70 When something is less likely
than that (ie., having only a fair probability), common parlance would deem
it "possible," but not "probable."
71
The Court in Gates appears to run counter to its own precedent as well as
linguistics. Jones v. United States,72 from which the Court draws much of its
notion of flexibility, upheld a warrant only because "there was substantial ba-
sis for [the magistrate] to conclude that narcotics were probably present in the
65. Id. at 2330.
66. Id. Compare Texas v. Brown, 103 S. Ct. 1535 (1983), discussed infra text accompanying
notes 106-108: "[Probable cause] merely requires that the facts available to the officer would
'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that certain items may be contraband or stolen
property or useful as evidence of a crime; it does not demand any showing that such a belief be
correct or more likely true than false." Id. at 1543 (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion) (emphasis
added, citations omitted).
67. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (predicating the constitutionality of a
warrantless search on probable cause).
68. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
69. The Court in Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, relied heavily on Draper v. United States, 358 U.S.
307 (1959), a case involving a named informant who had been reliable in the past and who had
provided the kind of detail (clothing, brief case, manner of walk, etc.) that would only be known
by one planning to meet the arrestee at the train station. Draper was certainly not a case in which
the arrestee was probably innocent.
70. WEBSTER's THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, Vol. II 1806 (17th ed. 1976)
("probable," definition 2), defines "probable" as being on a continuum, between certain and
possible.
71. "Possible" refers to that which is within the limit of what may happen or of what a person
or thing may do, although it may not seem probable." Id ("probable," definition 1).
72. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
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apartment. .... ,,73 Whatever may be said of the word "probable," there is
no evidence that "probably" ever meant anything other than more likely than
not.74 While one could argue that the Court has not always been true to this
standard,75 it has never before consciously applied a lesser one.
7 6
Because one could argue that etymology and precedent should not pre-
clude a result mandated by policy,7 7 a policy analysis of the Court's "fair
probability" standard is necessary. Typically a standard of evidence is predi-
cated on the amount and quality of harm caused by a wrong conclusion. For
example, one can only be convicted of a crime if one is proven guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt, because vastly more harm is done by convicting an innocent
person than by acquitting a guilty one.78 Nobody has ever suggested such a
standard for searches and seizures because the harm done to the wronged in-
nocent person is not nearly so great. On the other hand, the harm is not insig-
nificant. Unnecessary searches of innocent people contributed to the
Revolutionary War.79 Justice Jackson, shortly after returning from Nurem-
berg, noted the effect of allowing uncontrolled searches and seizures:
Among deprivations of rights, none is so effective in cowing a popu-
lation, crushing the spirit of the individual and putting terror in every
heart. Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first and most
effective weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary government. And
one need only briefly to have dwelt and worked among a people pos-
sessed of many admirable qualitites but deprived of these rights to
know that the human personality deteriorates and dignity and self-
reliance disappear where homes, persons and possessions are subject
at any hour to unheralded search and seizure by the police.
80
Furthermore, one's privacy, once breached, is not repaired easily
(whatever Judge Posner might think).8 ' Therefore, a search or seizure of a
73. Id at 271 (emphasis added). See also Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528, 533
(1964).
74. "[P]robably: 1. archaic: in a fairly convincing way; 2a: insofar as seems reasonable true,
factual, or to be expected: so far as fairly convincing evidence or indications go; b: without much
doubt: with practical certainty; very likely: in all probability." WEBSTER'S, supra note 70, at
1806.
75. I would argue that neither Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), nor Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949) was true to this standard. These cases may be explicable on the
grounds that each involved a rapidly moving automobile and each defendant had previously en-
gaged in the same kind of unlawful activities to the knowledge of the police officer. While I do
not believe that either of these factors justifies the result in these cases, they may explain them.
76. At least not in a criminal case. Cf. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967)
(upholding a lesser standard of probable cause for safety inspection searches).
77. See, e.g., Grey, Do We Have An Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L.REv. 703 (1975),
Nowak, Realism, Nihilism, and the Supreme Court: Do the Emperors Have Nothing but Robes?, 22
WASHBURN L.J. 246 (1983).
78. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970).
79. For example, "[t]he Bostonians complained that 'our houses and even our bed chambers
are exposed to be ransacked, our boxes, chests and trunks broke open, ravaged and plundered by
wretches, whom no prudent man would venture to employ even as menial servants."' Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 315 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting R. RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE
BILL OF RIGHTS, 1776-1791, at 25 (1955)).
80. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180-81 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
81. Judge Posner believes that a breach of one's fourth amendment rights can easily be coin-
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presumptively and probably innocent person should not be allowed without
strong justification.
The only serious argument for upholding such a search or seizure is the
concern that without such power too many crooks would escape detection. In
assessing the strength of this argument, one must evaluate the cops' alterna-
tives. If a warrant had not been issued in Gates, it is unlikely that the police
would or should have given up. They could have surveyed the Gates' home to
see if Lance and Sue drove straight through. Once the police ascertained that
they drove home nonstop their case for obtaining a warrant would have been
stronger.82 In addition, the police could have learned, either from other
sources or from surveillance, such things as whether the Gateses were in fact
unemployed and whether known drug dealers visited their home. Further-
more, when the police have reasonable suspicion, they may detain a suspect or
his luggage briefly to investigate the situation. This device, approved in United
States v. Place83 and Florida v. Royer,84 permits a relatively minor assault on
the privacy of citizens in order to avoid either subjecting a possibly innocent
citizen to a full blown search or letting a crook go free. Ironically, the defini-
tion of reasonable suspicion approved in Place may well be more demand-
ing8 5 than the "fair probability" definition of probable cause approved in
Gates, two weeks earlier. Indeed the frequency with which the Gates opinion
referred to cases in which only "reasonable suspicion" was in issue, 86 strongly
suggests that "probable cause" has been reduced to that level.
In Royer the Court had drawn a sharp distinction between reasonable
suspicion and probable cause. In that case, the police were originally attracted
to Mark Royer because he corresponded to a series of abstractly innocent
characteristics frequently possessed by drug smugglers, somewhat euphemisti-
cally called the "drug courier profile."
87
In Royer's case, the detectives' attention was attracted by the follow-
ing facts which were considered to be within the profile: (a) Royer
pensated by money damages. See Posner, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, 1981 Sup. CT. REV.
49. See also Posner, Excessive Sanctions for Governmental Misconduct in Criminal Cases. 57
WASH. L. REV. 635 (1982). For a critique, see Morris, The Exclusionary Rule, Deterrence and
Posner's Economic Analysis of Law, 57 WASH. L. REV. 647 (1982).
82. See Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2361 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Given United States v. Ross, 456
U.S. 798 (1982), which upheld the warrantless search of everything in a car as long as there was
probable cause to search, a police officer might be encouraged not to get a warrant in the hope that
probable cause will ripen by an event such as a nonstop drive from Florida to Illinois. One poten-
tial solution to this dilemma is to issue a warrant conditioned upon a future event. For example,
the Gates warrant could have been made conditional on the Gates arriving home within twenty-
four hours of their departure from Florida. Whether such a solution is desirable or even constitu-
tional is beyond the scope of this Article.
83. 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983).
84. 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983).
85. Place, 103 S. Ct. at 2642. See supra text accompanying notes 25-27.
86. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2328-29 (citing inter alia United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981)
and Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972)). Ironically, in Cortez it really was more probable
than not that the police would have found the sought-after evidence.
87. For a critical commentary on the amorphous character of the "profile," see J. CHOPER, Y.




was carrying American Tourister luggage, which appeared to be
heavy, (b) he was young, apparently between 25-35, (c) he was casu-
ally dressed, (d) Royer appeared pale and nervous, looking around at
other people, (e) Royer paid for his ticket in cash with a large
number of bills, and (f) rather than completing the airline identifica-
tion tag to be attached to checked baggage, which had space for a
name, address, and telephone number, Royer wrote only a name and
the destination.8
8
Upon questioning him, the detectives learned that he was travelling under
an assumed name. Although the Supreme Court, contrary to the Florida
court, found reasonable suspicion, it strongly rejected Florida's argument 9 for
probable cause:
The facts are that a nervous young man with two American Tourister
bags paid cash for an airline ticket to a "target city." These facts led
to inquiry, which in turn revealed that the ticket had been bought
under an assumed name. The proffered explanation did not satisfy
the officers. We cannot agree with the State, if this is its position, that
every nervous young man paying cash for a ticket to New York City
under an assumed name and carrying two heavy American Tourister
bags may be arrested and held to answer for a serious felony
charge. 90
Whatever might be said about Mark Royer's outward manifestations of
guilt, they were surely greater than anything emanating from Lance and Sue
Gates.91 Why then did the Court wax so eloquently about all the supposedly
innocent nervous young men who pay cash and fly under an assumed name
while apparently not caring about those innocent men who fly to Florida to
join their wives on a vacation?
One difference between the cases is that Gates involved a warrant,
whereas Royer did not. Gates did indeed indicate that when a warrant is ob-
tained it will be upheld so long as the magistrate had a "substantial basis" for
concluding that there was a "fair probability" of finding the sought after evi-
dence, even if the reviewing court disagrees. In so holding, the Court, despite
its protestations to the contrary, effectively adopted a limited good faith excep-
tion to the fourth amendment 92 for magistrate approved searches.93 Although
88. Royer, 103 S. Ct. at 1333, n.2.
89. Id at 1329 (rejecting Florida's argument for probable cause in Royer v. State, 389 So. 2d
1007 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)).
90. Royer, 103 S. Ct. at 1329.
91. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2360, n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting), in which Justice Stevens said of
Lance Gates:
Lance does not appear to have behaved suspiciously in flying down to Florida. He made
a reservation in his own name and gave an accurate home phone number to the airlines.
And Detective Mader's affidavit does not report that he did any of the other things drug
couriers are notoriou's for doing, such as paying for the ticket in cash, dressing casually,
looking pale and nervous, improperly filling out baggage tags, carrying American
Tourister luggage, not carrying any luggage, or changing airlines en route. (citations
omitted).
92. I say limited good faith exception to the fourth amendment rather than to the exclusion-
ary rule because the Court concluded that there was no violation of the fourth amendment at all;
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this aspect of the Gates/Royer dichotomy lends substance to the Court's usual
rhetoric about a preference for warrants, 94 it seems clear that the "fair
probability" standard applies to unwarranted as well as warranted searches.95
Another, and perhaps more significant, difference between Gates and
Royer is specificity. In Royer it was quite literally true that the police were
looking for anybody who fit the amorphous drug courier profile, while in
Gates attention was focused specifically on one couple. The importance of
specificity, extolled in both the fourth amendment itself96 and several deci-
sions thereunder,97 should not be understated. For example, if reliable infor-
mation establishes that sixty percent of all homes in a given neighborhood
contain evidence of crime, one might assume that the police could not search
all of them on the ground that with respect to each there is a "fair probability"
(indeed, a more likely than not probability) that evidence of crime will be
found therein. If specificity explains the Gates/Royer distinction, it is neces-
sary to focus on the anonymous tip, without which it is clear that the Bloom-
ingdale Police would not have had specific, nor for that matter any kind of,
suspicion towards the Gateses.
It has been argued persuasively that an anonymous informant should be
treated as presumptively unreliable.98 By phoning or writing anonymously,
the informant has deliberately shielded his identity and credibility from both
the police and the magistrate. While there may be some very good reasons for
desiring anonymity,99 there are also some downright ignoble ones.1° We can-
not know which type of reason motivated a particular anonymous informant.
In the Court's view, this inability to ascertain an anonymous informant's ve-
racity justifies removing the requirement of veracity:
The veracity of persons supplying anonymous tips is by hypothesis
largely unknown, and unknowable. As a result anonymous tips sel-
not that there was a violation, but the evidence would be admitted anyway. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at
2336. Nevertheless, upholding a warrant on a "substantial basis" for probable cause is effectively
an exception to the fourth amendment requirement that "no Warrants shall be issued but upon
probable cause."
93. The Court seemed to give every reason under the sun for not ruling on the good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule except the most obvious one. Having already determined that
the evidence was properly obtained under the fourth amendment, there was simply no occasion to
decide whether improperly obtained evidence would be admissible because the police believed
that it was properly obtained.
94. See, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
95. See supra text accompanying notes 67-69.
96. "Particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
97. See, e.g., United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
98. Note, Anonymous Tips, Corroboration, and Probable Cause: Reconciling the
Spinelli/Draper Dichotomy in Illinois v. Gates, 20 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 99, 107 (1983).
99. For example, protection of the informant from reprisal would be justification for ano-
nymity. The informant would not wish to upset Lance Gates, who does not seem like a very nice
person.
100. E.g., a desire to harass innocent neighbors whom the anonymous informant does not like.
See, e.g., Norton v. Turner, 427 F. Supp. 138, 142 (E.D. Va. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 581
F.2d 390, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1003 (1978). Since innocent victims of such searches frequently do
not sue, it is difficult to assess the extent of such occurrences.
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dom could survive a rigorous application of either of the Spinelli
prongs. Yet, such tips, particularly when supplemented by independ-
ent police investigation, frequently contribute to the solution of
otherwise "perfect crimes." While a conscientious assessment of the
basis for crediting such tips is required by the Fourth Amendment, a
standard that leaves virtually no place for anonymous citizen infor-
mants is not.101
The difficulty with this analysis is its implicit assumption that unless
anonymous tips are themselves credited, they will be unable to "contribute to
the solution of otherwise 'perfect crimes.'" In fact, by alerting police to people
who would otherwise not be suspects (such as Lance and Sue Gates), the tip
can provide the police with the opportunity to catch them doing something
apparently criminal, such as loading narcotics into or out of a car.
102
Gates may be explained as an overreaction to Spinelli. Under Spinelli, if
an informant was alleged to be "confidential and reliable," the magistrate
could not issue a warrant because he could not assess the reasons for the affi-
ant's assertion of reliability. 10 3 Thus, if the Gates letter had come from a
known person alleged to be reliable by the police, Spinelli would not have
allowed the warrant to issue. Yet in that situation the nonanonymity of the
informant (at least to the police) would have served as a substantial check
against a fabricated story designed to embarrass an innocent person.' 4 In the
actual Gates situation, however, neither the police nor the magistrate had any
assurance that the letter writer wanted to aid the police rather than harass
innocent neighbors of whose vacation plans he was jealous. Thus, the overly
restrictiveAguilar-Spinelli "two-pronged" test has been replaced by the insuffi-
ciently protective Gates "fair probability" test.
In sum, Gates helps protect the innocent person from crooks by abolish-
ing Aguilar-Spineili, and from cops by encouraging the use of warrants. On
balance, however, Gates is not a good decision because it allows probably in-
nocent people to be searched and exalts anonymity to heretofore unheard of
respectability.10 5
III. THE REST OF THE TERM
The results of the remaining five cases in the 1982 Term'0 6 (all of which
101. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2332.
102. See also supra textual paragraph accompanying notes 82-86. Indeed the informant's tip
in Gates said to "watch them carefully." Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2325.
103. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1968).
104. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146-147 (1972), in which the Court focused on the
nonanonymity of the informant to the police as a justification for finding reasonable suspicion.
105. No prior Supreme Court decision ever sustained a warrant or a finding of probable cause
on the word of an anonymous informant. Cf Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972) and People
v. Taggart, 20 N.Y.2d 335, 229 N.E.2d 581, 283 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1967), in which, under exceptional
circumstances, the functional equivalent of a frisk was permitted on the basis of an anonymous tip
(tip said that defendant, who was standing in a group of school children, was concealing a fully
loaded gun in his pocket).
106. United States v. Knotts, 103 S. Ct. 1081 (1983); Texas v. Brown, 103 S. Ct. 1535 (1983);
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upheld the search and seizure) were mixed. Texas v. Brown 10 7 epitomized
both good and bad results. In upholding the seizure and subsequent search of
an uninflated tied balloon found in plain view, 108 the Court subjected an inno-
cent person to no substantial risk. The only use suggested at trial for such a
balloon is to carry narcotics. Consequently, the potential intrusion on an in-
nocent person is trivial. Thus, in balancing a citizen's need to be free from
both cops and crooks, this limited invasion seems reasonable.
The Court's unanimous holding that the balloon was properly found in
plain view is another matter. The first predicate for this conclusion was the
Court's approval of the stopping of an individual at what the plurality called
"a routine driver's license checkpoint."' 1 9 Unquestionably such a stop is a
seizure, whose reasonableness must be established. 110 As the Court said in
Delaware v. Prouse:111
An individual operating or traveling in an automobile does not lose
all reasonable expectation of privacy simply because the automobile
and its use are subject to government regulation. (citation omitted)
Automobile travel is a basic, pervasive, and often necessary mode of
transportation to and from one's home, workplace and leisure activi-
ties. Many people spend more hours each day traveling in cars than
walking on the streets. Undoubtedly, many find a greater sense of
security and privacy traveling in an automobile than they do in ex-
posing themselves by pedestrian or other modes of travel. Were the
individual subject to unfettered governmental intrusion every time
he entered an automobile, the security guaranteed by the Fourth
Amendment would be seriously circumscribed.. . . [Pleople are not
shorn of all Fourth Amendment protection when they step from their
homes onto the public sidewalks. Nor are they shorn of those inter-
ests when they step from the sidewalks into their automobiles.'
12
Although the Court inProuse invalidated random spot checks, it empha-
sized the limited nature of its holding: "This holding does not preclude the
State of Delaware or other States from developing methods for spot checks
that involve less intrusion or that do not involve the unconstrained exercise of
discretion. Questioning of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops is one
possible alternative." 13 Since the roadblock issue was not before the Court in
Prouse, this "one possible alternative" language should not be read as sus-
Illinois v. Lafayette, 103 S. Ct. 2605 (1983); Illinois v. Andreas, 103 S. Ct. 3319 (1983); Michigan v.
Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983).
107. 103 S. Ct. 1535 (1983).
108. Although the judgment of the Court was announced in a plurality opinion of four Jus-
tices (Rehnquist, Burger, O'Connor and White), two more (Powell and Blackmun), concurred in
upholding the search and seizure, thereby rendering it the opinion of the Court. The remaining
Justices (Stevens, Brennan, and Marshall) upheld the seizure, but would have remanded for a
determination of the search's validity.
109. Brown, 103 S. Ct. at 1538.
110. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
111. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
112. Id. at 662-63.
113. Id. at 663.
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taining the constitutionality of such a stop, but simply as reserving the ques-
tion for a future case."14 Consequently, if the Brown Court wished to sustain a
roadblock, it should have justified its conclusion and not treated the matter as
established." 5 Instead, the Court stated that "[t]he Court of Criminal Appeals
...did not question. . . the validity of the officer's initial stop of appellant's
vehicle as part of a license check. . . and we agree."
116
The fourth amendment propriety of roadblocks should have been a most
difficult question. As Prouse tells us, "the permissibility of a particular law
enforcement practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual's
Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental
interests."117 In assessing the propriety of roadblocks, much of the Prouse
balancing is applicable--"It seems common sense that the percentage of all
drivers on the road who are driving without a license is very small and that the
numbers of licensed drivers who will be stopped in order to find an unlicensed
operator will be large indeed."' 18
It is true that unlike a random stop, a roadblock neither unfairly singles
out an individual for special disfavored treatment, nor subjects him to the
trauma of being pulled over by a police siren. On the other hand, because of
the number of drivers to be questioned, a roadblock can be substantially more
time-consuming than a random stop. Furthermore, unlike a fixed border
checkpoint 1 9 or truck weigh station, the location of a roadblock is unknown
to the traveler in advance. Therefore, he cannot allocate time for it in his
travel plans. Consequently, the roadblock might delay such diverse travelers
as an expectant mother rushing to a hospital, a law professor rushing to his
nine o'clock class, or a lonely man rushing to a date with the woman of his
dreams. On balance, citizens' freedom from unannounced roadblocks appears
to be more important than their freedom from the few unlicensed drivers
caught therein.
In addition to its uncritical upholding of roadblocks, the Court's finding
that the balloon was properly in plain view was predicated on a carte blanche
right to use a searchlight, thus creating more hazards for the innocent. Apart
from the etymological point that a searchlight is not called a searchlight for
nothing, people do not and should not expect police or anyone else to be shin-
ing searchlights into their vacant parked cars (or even their homes).' 20 Fur-
114. Cf. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 883 n.8 (1975), invalidating random
border stops but suggesting that "[olur decision. . . does not imply that state and local enforce-
ment agencies are without power to conduct such limited stops as are necessary to enforce laws
regarding drivers' licenses, vehicle registration, truck weights, and similar matters." Id. Prouse,
however, invalidated random stops to enforce laws regarding driver's licenses. Prouse, 440 U.S. at
663-64.
115. "If new ground is to be broken, the ground must be justified and not treated as though it
were old ground." Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 473
(1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
116. Brown, 103 S. Ct. at 1541.
117. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654.
118. Id. at 659-60.
119. Like that upheld in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
120. The Court held that:
1984]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
thermore, an innocent person traveling on a public thoroughfare might keep
such private items as a nude picture of his spouse on the seat next to him. Had
Brown been such a person, the picture would have been visible when, to his
surprise, he was stopped and searched by a cop with a searchlight. While the
use of a searchlight may sometimes be justified, and may even have been justi-
fied inBrown, 121 it is nonetheless a search with the potential to affect innocent
people, and therefore should be permitted only when reasonable.
Finally, at least four Justices upheld the propriety of Officer Maples' shift-
ing his position to obtain a better view of the interior of the glove
compartment: 12
2
Likewise, the fact that Maples "changed [his] position" and "bent
down at an angle so [he] could see what was inside" Brown's car, is
irrelevant to Fourth Amendment analysis. The general public could
peer into the interior of Brown's automobile from any number of
angles; there is no reason Maples should be precluded from observ-
ing as an officer what would be entirely visible to him as a private
citizen. There is no legitimate expectation of privacy. . . shielding
that portion of the interior of an automobile which may be viewed
from outside the vehicle by either inquisitive passersby or diligent
police officers. In short, the conduct that enabled Maples to observe
the interior of Brown's car and of his open glove compartment was
not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.' 23
The flaw in this analysis is that citizens do not normally leave their glove
compartments open for "either inquisitive passersby or diligent police of-
ficers." Indeed, that is the one place in the passenger compartment that an
innocent citizen would assume that prying eyes would not be able to peer. The
only reason it was open to Officer Maples' view was that he asked Brown for
his registration, which is usually kept in the glove compartment. Conse-
quently, if the plurality opinion ultimately prevails (and nobody on the Court
[I]t is ... beyond dispute that Maples' action in shining his flashlight to illuminate the
interior of Brown's car trenched upon no right secured to the latter by the Fourth
Amendment. The Court said in United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927) that "[the]
use of a searchlight is comparable to the use of a marine glass or field glass. It is not
prohibited by the Constitution." Numerous other courts have agreed that the use of arti-
ficial means to illuminate a darkened area simply does not constitute a search.
Brown, 103 S. Ct. at 1541 (citations omitted).
121. On direct examination, Patrolman Maples testified as follows:
Q: [Prosecutor]: When he put his hand in his pocket, did you do anything with the
flashlight?
A: Not immediately, I didn't.
Q: All right. Was there-you say not immediately. Did you at some point in time shine
the light in the car?
A: Yes, sir, I did.
Q: All right, and why did you do that?
A: His hand was in his pocket too long and it worried me.
Brown v. State, 617 S.W.2d 196, 199 (Tex. 1981).
122. Justices Rehnquist, Burger, White and O'Connor. The remaining Justices did not reach
this issue. Brown, 103 S. Ct. 1535.
123. Id. at 1542.
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questioned it), 124 the cops will be able to set up roadblocks whenever they
wish to look into a glove compartment and accomplish that objective by ask-
ing for the driver's registration.'
25
These new burdens (roadblock, searchlight, and prying eyes) although not
as outrageous as those permitted by Villamonte-Marquez126 will affect more
innocent citizens simply because more citizens drive automobiles than boats.
Indeed, there is hardly anyone who may not be subject to these additional
instrusions. That the Court could so cavalierly permit these intrusions, while
carefully analyzing and ultimately fragmenting over the less important ques-
tion whether the properly seized balloon could be opened,127 is indicative of
its failure to consistently recognize that the innocent should be the primary
beneficiaries of the fourth amendment.
In contrast to Brown, Illinois v. Lafayette,128 which upheld a police station
inventory search of an arrestee's shoulder bag, did not significantly increase
the risk to the innocent. Long before Lafayette, one's possessions could be
searched upon arrest, 129 even for so trivial a crime as disturbing the peace,
130
the crime for which Lafayette was arrested. Whatever reasons existed for
searching Lafayette upon arrest, 131 those reasons continued at the station
house. Consequently, upholding the search added little to potential intrusive-
ness.' 32 Indeed, it might even discourage unnecessary but lawful searches in-
cident to arrest since the police now know that failure to search immediately
incident to an arrest will not preclude an inventory search prior to incarcera-
tion. Thus, some unknown number of arrested but not incarcerated individu-
als 133 may avoid an unnecessary search.
More important from the perspective of the innocent arrestee 134 is the
added protection for his property engendered by the inventory process. If, as
Lafayette had argued, the cops put his shoulder bag in a sealed bag without
inventorying its contents, a police employee could have entered his bag, stolen
some its contents, resealed it, and claimed total innocence when Lafayette
124. See supra note 122.
125. In Brown, the roadblock was set up on a street "which was part of a 'medium' area of
narcotics traffic." Brown, 103 S. Ct. at 1543.
126. 103 S. Ct. 2573 (1983). See supra notes 28-42.
127. See supra note 108.
128. 103 S. Ct. 2605 (1983).
129. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
130. See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S.
218 (1973).
131. The classic reasons are potential destruction of evidence or obtaining a weapon. The
right to search exists even when these dangers do not. Id.
132. It is arguable that an inventory search may be more thorough than a search incident to an
arrest because of the greater need to inventory carefully each item however non-incriminating it
may be. This possible distinction is too speculative a base upon which to predicate a constitu-
tional rule.
133. Some arrestees post bond or are otherwise released. Indeed, this case was remanded to
determine whether the police intended to incarcerate Lafayette. Lafayette, 103 S. Ct. at 2611 n.3.
134. By "innocent arrestee" I mean innocent in the sense of not possessing evidence of crime,
see supra note 4, whether or not he is innocent of the underlying crime for which he was arrested.
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claimed that some previously unidentified contents had disappeared.' 35 Fur-
thermore, a crooked arrestee t36 could make a false claim of such theft thereby
causing the cops13 7 considerable inconvenience or expense. Finally, because a
weapon or bomb could be in the bag, the inventory procedure helps protect
both police employees and other arrestees.
I do not suggest that the inventory procedure might not adversely affect
some innocent arrestees. Certainly there are those who might prefer to risk
police pilferage rather than expose their nude pictures or contraceptive devices
to the police. The fourth amendment, however, does not forbid all searches of
even the innocent; only unreasonable ones. Given the utility of an inventory
search, this is one occasion when individual privacy can reasonably be ex-
pected to yield.
There is no substantial risk that the police will use Lafayette to make a
subterfuge arrest in order to create an opportunity to conduct a search. A cop
so predisposed would search immediately upon arrest as the law permitted
him to do even before Lafayette.138 Consequently, the Lafayette result does
not unreasonably burden the innocent person.'3
9
If Lafayette created no unreasonable risk to the innocent, Illinois v. An-
dreas,t4° which sustained a warrantless search of a table previously found to
contain narcotics, created virtually no risks at all. Andreas involved a customs
inspector's lawful border search of a package sent from Calcutta, India, to
John Andreas in Chicago. Upon opening first the package and then the table
in the package, the customs inspector found a substance that he believed was
marijuana. After a drug enforcement agent (Labek) chemically determined
that the substance was indeed marijuana, the table and the marijuana were
resealed and delivered to Andreas by Labek and a Chicago policeman (Lip-
sek) posing as deliverymen.
Labek and Lipsek entered the apartment building and an-
nounced they had a package for respondent. Respondent came to
the lobby and identified himself. In response to Lipsek's comment
about the weight of the package, respondent answered that it "wasn't
135. Not unthinkable, given citizen-police animosity.
136. If the police are doing their jobs, surely there must be a higher percentage of crooked
arrestees than crooks in general.
137. Who, after all, are the servants of us innocent citizens.
138. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). See supra note 129 and accompanying
text.
139. The rationale of the decision in Lafayette is another matter. The decision is predicated
on the assumption that even if a less intrusive method of accomplishing the governmental objec-
tives is available, it need not be employed. Lafayette, 103 S. Ct. at 2610. The applicability of the
"least intrusive means" requirement fared better in other cases this term. It was accepted (by four
Justices) in Florida v. Royer, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1325-26 (1983) (White, J., plurality opinion). Justice
Brennan later endorsed this plurality position, Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3468, 3488 (1983)
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Four other Justices, however, rejected the plurality's position. Royer,
103 S. Ct. at 1335 n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). It was also an
important factor in United States v. Place, 103 S. Ct. 2637, 2645-46 (1983), decided the same day
as Lafayette. The ultimate scope of the "least restrictive means" rule is yet to be developed.
140. 103 S. Ct. 3319 (1983).
[Vol. 62
COPS AND CROOKS
that heavy; that he had packaged it himself, that it only contained a
table."
At repondent's request, the officers making the delivery left the
container in the hallway outside respondent's apartment. Labek sta-
tioned himself to keep the container in sight and observed respon-
dent pull the container into the apartment; he saw respondent leave
his apartment, walk to the end of the corridor, look out the window,
and then return to the apartment. Labek remained in the building
but did not keep the apartment door under constant surveillance.
Between thirty and forty-five minutes after the delivery, but
before Lipsek could return with a warrant, respondent reemerged
from the apartment with the shipping container and was immediately
arrested by Labek and taken to the police station. There, the officers
reopened the container and seized the marijuana found inside the
table. No search warrant had been obtained.141
Although the Court's holding that this did not constitute a search at all
was rightly criticized by the dissent, 142 the search was not unreasonable. Given
the chemical analysis and Andreas' admission that he packaged it himself,
143
there could be little doubt of his guilt. His only argument was that he might
have removed the marijuana while he had the package in his apartment out of
Labek's view. Despite this possibility, searching the box and table (with or
without a warrant) was more protective of true fourth amendment values than
searching the apartment (with or without a warrant). The apartment was much
more likely than the box to contain innocent private items that Andreas (and
his co-tenants, if any) might wish to keep to themselves. Assuming no other
grounds for probable cause, there would be no justification for searching the
apartment if, as anticipated, the marijuana was found in the box.144 Only if it
were not found would the sanctity of his home need to be invaded.
There is at least one other reason for upholding the search. 145 Andreas
conceded that upon his arrest the box was properly seized.146 Given that he
transported marijuana in the box, it could be used as evidence at his trial,
141. Id. at 3321-22.
142. Id. at 3325 (Brennan, J., dissenting). "The court answers that question by announcing
that the second search is not a search at all. We have.. . never held that the physical opening
and examining of a container in the possession of an individual was anything other than a
'search'." Id. (emphasis added).
143. Andreas, 103 S. Ct. at 3321. Since Andreas volunteered the information about packaging
the table himself, the fifth amendment was not violated. Cf. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293,
303-04 (1966) (fifth amendment privilege aginst compulsory self-incrimination not violated when
conversations wholly voluntary). Since Andreas was not in custody, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
435, 436 (1966) was not violated. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (defendant not in
custody, and Miranda rights not violated when defendant came to police station voluntarily and
was informed he was not under arrest).
144. SeeAndreas, 103 S. Ct. 3321-22.
145. I assume that it could be justified neither as a search incident to an arrest, since the search
was not conducted contemporaneously with the arrest, see United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1,
15 (1977); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 368 (1964), nor as an inventory search, since that
was not the intent of the officers.
146. Id. at 3323 n.4.
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whether or not it still contained marijuana. 147 Therefore, in opening the box
and the table, the government was simply examining evidence rightfully in its
possession. 148 The fact that they may have hoped and expected to find more
evidence (the marijuana) should not invalidate this rightful examination of
their properly seized evidence. Thus, Andreas is a case in which the cops
properly nailed a crook without subjecting a possibly innocent citizen to an
unreasonable search.
In sharp contrast to Andreas is United States v. Knolls, 149 which upheld
the warrantless monitoring of a radio transmitter (beeper) that had been at-
tached to a drum of chloroform purchased by Knotts' coconspirators and
driven by another coconspirator to Knotts' secluded mountain cabin. Al-
though the cops may have had reasonable suspicion towards Knotts' code-
fendants, 150 the opinion proceeded on the assumption that electronic
monitoring was not a search or seizure at all, thereby rendering any considera-
tion of reasonableness irrelevant. Consequently, on nothing more than a
whim (or even a desire to harass), the police could lawfully monitor a beeper
attached to a can of chloroform or any other personal item' s' and thereby
subject any citizen to twenty-four hour surveillance.
The Court's response to this argument can only be described as a classic
"good-news/bad-news" comment.
But the fact is that the "reality hardly suggests abuse." If such drag-
net type law enforcement practices as respondent envisions should
eventually occur, there will be time enough then to determine
whether different constitutional principles may be applicable. Inso-
far as respondent's complaint appears to be simply that scientific de-
vices such as the beeper enabled the police to be more effective in
detecting crime, it simply has no constitutional foundation. We have
never equated police efficiency with unconstitutionality, and we de-
cline to do so now.
152
147. The desk was an instrumentality of crime, which could be used to show where the mari-
juana was seen and how the marijuana was stored.
148. Cf. Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 61 (1967) (upholding search of a car in lawful
custody).
149. 103 S. Ct. 1081 (1983).
150. Id. at 1083. Suspicion attached to Knotts' codefendants when the 3M Company, which
manufactures chemicals in St. Paul, notified a narcotics investigator for the Minnesota Bureau of
Criminal Apprehension that Armstrong, a former 3M employee, had been stealing chemicals that
could be used in manufacturing illicit drugs. Visual surveillance of Armstrong revealed that after
leaving the employ of 3M Company, he had been purchasing similar chemicals from the Hawkins
Chemical Company in Minneapolis. The Minnesota narcotics officers observed that after Arm-
strong had made a purchase, he would deliver the chemicals to codefendant Petschen. With the
consent of the Hawkins Chemical Company, officers installed a beeper inside a five gallon
container used for chloroform, one of the precursor chemicals used to manufacture illicit drugs.
Hawkins agreed that when Armstrong next purchased chloroform, the chloroform would be
placed in this particular container.
151. Knotts did not challenge the installation, as opposed to monitoring, of the beeper, believ-
ing he lacked standing to do so. Knolls, 103 S. Ct. at 1084. Unfortunately, his analysis is probably
correct. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978);
Loewy, supra note 6, at 1270-72.
152. Knotts, 103 S. Ct. at 1086 (quoting Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 566 (1978)).
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The good news is the Court's recognition that the purpose of the fourth
amendment is not to limit effective crime detection that has no impact on the
innocent. The bad news is its failure to recognize the adverse impact of its
decision on the innocent.
It was certainly possible that those transporting the chloroform were seek-
ing privacy for a scientific experiment that they hoped would win the Nobel
Prize. Indeed, the chloroform simply might have been for some future use
while the visit to the mountain cabin was for some secret, but constitutionally
protected, political meeting 53 or romantic' 54 interlude.
Much of the Court's rationale is predicated on the assumption that the
information gleaned from the beeper could have been ascertained by either
following the car to Knotts' property155 or by stationing one's self in a public
area outside of Knotts' property.' 56 The difficulty with this analysis is that the
unseen beeper renders it impossible to know one is being followed. An inno-
cent scientist, politician, or lover approaching the Knotts' cabin might not
enter if he were being followed or he observed activity outside the property.
While such surveillance would undoubtably be intrusive, it would at least
leave the innocent citizen with the option to preserve his privacy. The most
insidious problem with the beeper is that the innocent citizen doesn't even
know that he is being observed.
For this reason, the Court's reliance on Smith v. Maryland157 is mis-
placed. Smith, in which the Court also was not overly concerned with the
innocent,158 upheld the indiscriminate use of a pen register that could give the
police a record of every phone number dialed on a particular telephone.
There, however, the individual at least knew he was dialing numbers and ar-
guably should have been aware that some public record might be made of
them.' 59 The visitor to a mountain cabin who sees nobody around for miles,
on the other hand, surely should not be aware that "Big Brother" 160 might be
watching him.
The final fourth amendment case of the Term, Michigan v. Long, 161 up-
held a protective search for weapons in the passenger compartment of an auto-
mobile based on a reasonable belief that the automobile contained weapons
potentially dangerous to the officers. The case arose as follows:
Deputies Howell and Lewis were on patrol in a rural area one eve-
ning when, shortly after midnight, they observed a car traveling er-
ratically and at excessive speed. The officers observed the car turning
down a side road, where it swerved off into a shallow ditch. Long,
153. See NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288 (1964).
154. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
155. Knolls, 103 S. Ct. at 1087.
156. Id. at 1086.
157. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
158. See Loewy, supra note 6, at 1254-56.
159. Although I confess that I was not until I read the opinion.
160. See G. ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FoUR. (1st Am. Ed. 1949).
161. 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983).
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the only occupant of the automobile, met the deputies at the rear of
the car, which was protruding from the ditch onto the road. The
door on the driver's side of the vehicle was left open.
Deputy Howell requested Long to produce his operator's li-
cense, but he did not respond. After the request was repeated, Long
produced his license. Long again failed to respond when Howell re-
quested him to produce the vehicle registration. After another re-
peated request, Long, whom Howell thought "appeared to under the
influence of something," turned from the officers and began walking
toward the open door of the vehicle. The officers followed Long and
both observed a large hunting knife on the floorboard of the driver's
side of the car. The officers then stopped Long's progress and sub-
jected him to a Terry protective pat-down, which revealed no
weapons.
Long and Deputy Lewis then stood by the rear of the vehicle
while Deputy Howell shined his flashlight into the interior of the ve-
hicle, but did not actually enter it. The purpose of Howell's action
was "to search for other weapons." The officer noticed that some-
thing was protruding from under the armrest of the front seat. He
knelt in the vehicle and lifted the armrest. He saw an open pouch on
the front seat, and upon flashing his light on the pouch, determined
that it contained what appeared to be marijuana. After Deputy
Howell showed the pouch and its contents to Deputy Lewis, Long
was arrested for possession of marijuana. A further search of the
interior of the vehicle, including the glovebox, revealed neither more
contraband nor the vehicle registration. 62
In upholding this search, the Court emphasized that "the reasonableness
in all circumstances of the particular governmental intrusion of a citizen's per-
sonal security"'163 is the touchstone of analysis. While this same chameleon-
like concept of "reasonableness" produced the outrageous Villamonte-Mar-
quez decision, 164 the Court in Long at least applied it in a (pardon the expres-
sion) reasonable manner. The Court emphasized Long's intoxicated behavior,
the knife in the car, Long's need to enter the car, and the limited nature of the
weapons search.' 65 Surely, this approach protects the innocent more than the
carte blanche monitoring approved in Knotts. 66
On the other hand, the Long approach is certainly not risk free to the
162. Id. at 3473 (citations omitted). The police also searched the trunk where they found
seventy-five pounds of marijuana. Id. Since the Michigan Supreme Court had found the initial
intrusion unlawful, id. at 3473-74, it never reached the questions whether the search of the trunk
would have been proper had the original marijuana been properly found.
163. Id. at 3481, (quoting Pensylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09 (1977) and Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)).
164. Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. 2573 discussed supra text accompanying notes 28-42.
165. Presumably if the pouch had been closed, the officers could not have looked inside. Cf.
Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968) (opening soft package found pursuant to a frisk was not
justified because officer had no reason to believe it contained a weapon).
166. See supra notes 149-160 and accompanying text.
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innocent. Arguably, a lawfully possessed hunting knife 67 is neither an un-
common sight in rural Michigan, nor reason to believe that further weapons
will be found. Since the knife itself had already been seized and a frisk proved
that the driver was unarmed, it is at least arguable that the officers' suspicions
were not reasonable. More importantly, since this type of ad hoc police judg-
ment is necessarily an individual one and cannot be subject to a "bright-line
test,"168 there is a danger that cops will feel "reasonably suspicious" about
weapons even when they should not; a feeling that may be exacerbated by the
Court's ever increasing reluctance to second guess a police officer's "good
faith" judgment.
1 69
Long might have been a less dangerous precedent if there had been a
companion case invalidating a similar search conducted without reasonable
suspicion.' 70 Nevertheless, in a Term that allowed the suspicionless boarding
of boats,17 stopping of cars,172 shining of lights, 173 and electronic monitoring
of personal property,174 maybe we should be grateful for at least the nominal
requirement of reasonableness, and hopeful that perhaps it will be honored
more in the observance than the breach.
IV. CONCLUSION
It seems fair to conclude that in the 1982 Term the Court's performance in
protecting citizens from both cops and crooks was mixed. It upheld some
searches that created virtually no risk to the innocent, 175 and others that could
subject innocent citizens to potentially intolerable burdens.' 76 The principle
reason for this disparity is that the Court usually views the fourth amendment
from the perspective of cops and crooks, thereby rendering the effect on the
innocent all but irrelevant.
The remedy is to refocus attention on the definition of "reasonable":
To say that the search must be reasonable is to require some criterion
167. I assume that Long's possession of the knife was lawful, since no argument to the con-
trary was made.
168. A bright-line test is one in which a rule is spelled out for a broad category of cases so that
the police need not worry whether the rationale for the rule is applicable to the precise situation.
For example, although a search incident to arrest is justified to protect the officer or preserve
evidence, the bright-line rule allows such a search even when those needs are not present. See
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 21M.(1973).
169. In the only two fourth amendment cases lost by the government this term (Florida v.
Royer, 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983); United States v. Place, 103 S. Ct. 2367 (1983)), the officers' lack of
good faith in minimizing the intrusion contributed to the loss. See supra note 139.
170. Compare Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) with Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968)
(companion case of Terry) (Court found officer's safety concerns reasonable in Terry, 392 U.S. at
27-31, and unreasonable in Sibron, 392 U.S. at 63-66).
171. See United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. 2573 (1983).
172. See Texas v. Brown, 103 S. Ct. 1535 (1983).
173. See id.
174. See United States v. Knotts, 103 S. Ct. 1081 (1983).
175. See United States v. Place, 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983); Illinois v. Andreas, 103 S. Ct. 1081
(1983).
176. United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. 2573 (1983); United States v. Knotts,
103 S. Ct. 1081 (1983).
1984]
NORTH CAROLINA LA4W.REVIEW[
of reason. It is no guide at all either for a jury or for district judges
or the police to say that an "unreasonable search" is forbidden-that
the search must be reasonable. What is the test of reason which
makes a search reasonble? The test is the reason underlying and ex-
pressed by the Fourth Amendment: the history and experience
which it embodies and the safeguards afforded by it against the evils
to which it was a response.1
77
Since the primary function of the fourth amendment is to protect the in-
nocent, reasonableness should be defined in terms of balancing the likelihood
of the searchee's innocence, the harm done to him if innocent, and the gain in
crime detection or police protection if he is guilty or armed. It is precisely this
balance that has given us probable cause and the magistrate. Although its
mere invocation will not easily resolve difficult questions, 178 it has served us
well. Let us permanently resurrect it.
177. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 83 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting),
178. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983); see also supra notes 161-174.
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